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Foreword 
The Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) Project at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is continuing its subproject UResearch and Develop- 
ment Management in Russia's Transition to a Market Economy". This subproject was 
originally started upon the request of the then Soviet State Committee for Science and 
Technology, and is still supported by the Russian Government. The major goal of this 
subproject is to advance understanding of R&D management and then to translate this 
understanding into practical advice to Russian policy-makers. The project is organized 
as a series of case studies and seminars, and is aimed at bringing together Russian policy 
makers and scholars and Western experts to exchange their views and research results in 
the field, and to promote further contacts and research collaboration among them. 
Until now, five workshops on various aspects of R&D management have been held, 
and the first volume of papers presented at these meetings has been published (Serguei 
Glaziev and Christoph Schneider, (eds.), Research and Development Management in  the 
Transition to a Market Economy, IIASA Collaborative Paper CP-93-1, March 1993). 
Preparations for the second volume are currently underway, and participants of the project 
have their studies in various stages of completion. This study by Dr. Leonid Kosals is 
nearly completed, and is circulated as an IIASA Working Paper to enable the author to 
broadly discuss his results with other project participants. 
Il'dar Karimov 
Scientific Project Coordinator 
Contents 
1 Introduction 
2 Demilitarization in Russia: Do Managers in 
Military R&D Institutes Support It? 
3 Looking at the Situation in Military Institutes 
4 The Situation in Stable and Disintegrating 
Institutes: A Comparative Analysis 
5 Instead of a Conclusion: Is There Neo-militarism in Russia? 
References 
Military R&D Institutes in the 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the socio-economic situation in military R8cD 
institutes in the context of demilitarization in Russia. 
By 1985, the USSR was a country where the major social institutions were primarily 
subjected to the Soviet State's military-strategic priorities. The Soviet Union possessed 
a great army which was superior to its economic possibilities and real national interests. 
This army was placed under the command of the ruling elite of the CPSU and was manned 
on the principle of universal military service. 
From an economic perspective, militarization can be characterized by a considerable 
share of the expenditure of the State budget, in the huge military-industrial complex 
(MIC), in the idleness of very great mobilization capacities during peace time and, ac- 
cordingly, in the under-developed consumer sector. 
From a political perspective, militarization resulted in the military authorities' con- 
siderable influence on domestic and foreign decision-making, in the stationing of great 
contingents of Soviet armed forces abroad, and in the orientation towards forced suppres- 
sion of political opponents inside the country and abroad. 
From an ideological perspective, militarism reflected itself in implanting in the con- 
sciousness of the population "the enemy image" (meaning world capitalism and Zionism), 
in cultivating the necessity of being constantly ready for the coming war, in spreading the 
Messiah idea of carrying Communist beliefs to other countries even by force, and in the 
concept of class struggle permitting civil war. 
From an educational perspective, it was taken for granted that everyone should par- 
ticipate in a course of primary military training and university students should have 
participated in a military course a t  special military departments and obtained the title of 
LL. junior reserve lieutenant". 
It was not only Soviet formal organizations that were imbued with a sense of mili- 
tarism. Totalitarian ideology, as well as the necessity of military service for the majority 
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of men, resulted in corresponding values and behavior patterns penetrating deeply into 
the consciousness of the population and people's everyday life. 
The majority of the people really and truly believed that the West wished to con- 
quer the USSR and that they should be ready to repel military aggression from abroad. 
Moreover, the militarization of life in the USSR led to the idea being deeply-rooted in the 
consciousness of the people that conflicts and confrontation between states and people, 
and between social groups and even separate individuals, were allowed to be settled by 
force rather than by negotiation and according to international laws. 
Perestroika, initiated by Gorbachev, had the slogan of stopping the confrontation 
between the USSR and the West, and bringing about the participation of the USSR in 
the World Community as a democratic State settling its contradictions with other states 
according to the law and not by force. 
CPSU leaders began to speak about the necessity of curtailing the armed forces, reduc- 
ing military expenditures, withdrawing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, and carrying 
out the conversion of military production. 
Actually, the intention to start demilitarization of the Soviet State and society began 
to take shape. However, under the conditions of preserving the CPSU, the KGB, the 
Union Defense Ministries, "the Big Ninesn (industrial ministries in charge of military 
production), there was no room for real demilitarization and it could not begin. 
It was only after the events of August 1991, with the disintegration of the USSR and 
the liquidation of the CPSU, that such conditions were created and the Yeltsin-Gaidar 
government embarked on the path of reforms. 
The withdrawal of troops from abroad became intensive enough. Military expenditure 
was reduced. Plans of reforming the army, giving up universal military service and creating 
a professional army began to be developed. The conversion of military production began. 
After some years of glasnost, the majority of the population no longer looked upon the 
West as its enemy and stopped thinking that there was someone out to conquer Russia. 
Demilitarization became a part of government policy in Russia. For the first time mil- 
itary doctrine was elaborated and openly published where the "potential military enemy" 
was absent (the potential military enemy was the compulsory term for Soviet military 
officials to describe relations with the West). Russia is making an attempt to create a 
peaceful society with a peace oriented economy. 
The actual success of this policy is dependent upon practical steps of many Russian 
civilian and military organizations-ministries, factories, research institutes-to make 
conversion, to produce civilian goods, and to carry out civil oriented R&D. In turn, the 
positive attitudes to develop civilian goods and R&D are the precondition of a successful 
demilitarization policy. 
This paper is based on four investigations carried out with the author's participa- 
tion during 1991-1993. Three of these investigations were fulfilled at the request of the 
Ministry of Science and Technical Policy of Russia. 
The first investigation, carried out in the middle of 1992, was based on the data of a 
sociological survey of 565 managers in 21 institutes in Moscow, Novosibirsk, Voronezh, and 
Vladimir. There was a military organization engaged in R&D among the institutes. This 
contributed to making a preliminary analysis of the different situations that military R&D 
and civil institutes are faced with, and revealing the specific features of socio-economic 
problems inherent in both types of organizations. 
The second investigation, carried out at the end of 1992, was based on a series of 13 
interviews with researchers and managers of 7 Moscow and Kirov military R&D institutes. 
The subject matter of the interviews embraced a wide range of problems: the character of 
the institutes' activities, their socio-economic position, personnel situation, foreign ties, 
involvement in marketing relations, the changes they undergo in connection with the 
processes going on in the country, as well as the changes which the future may hold in 
store. 
The third investigation, carried out in February-March 1993, included a sociological 
survey of 223 managers of five military R&D institutes in Moscow, St. Petersburg and 
Kirov, The problems to be analyzed were as follows: the situation within the institutes 
(carrying out R&D, the economic position and personnel situation, payment for work 
done), problems of R&D conversion, the managers' attitude towards Russian Government 
policy, the institutes foreign ties and their possible perspectives. 
The fourth study, conducted by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research 
(VCIOM) in September 1993, polled 200 experts on the question about the short-term 
results of military conflicts in which Russia was involved at that moment. Politicians, 
government officials, scientists and journalists were among the experts. 
Each of these investigations was not representative in the strict statistical sense of 
the word. The institutes and respondents were selected in an expert way because of the 
secrecy of statistical information concerning the military complex and the difficulties of 
organizing large-scale investigations of the objects in question. 
However, according to competent experts, we have managed to grasp the main prob- 
lems of military R&D institutes because the investigations embraced quite a large number 
of organizations belonging to different spheres of military science situated both in the cen- 
ter and in outlying districts, with both relatively good and bad economic positions. 
The set of sociological instruments for the investigations was worked out by the author 
together with Professor R. Ryvkina (VCIOM). All possible errors and inaccuracies are 
the responsibility of the author. 
The author expresses his gratitude to V. Valyukov, B. Odintsov, and B. Yurlov who 
are officials at the Russian Ministry of Science and Technical Policy for their assistance 
in organizing the investigations. The author is also grateful to the ETI Project at IIASA 
for providing technical support. 
Demilitarization in Russia: Do Managers in 
Military R&D Institutes Support It? 
The manager's attitudes to demilitarization in the context of their attitudes to economic 
and international affairs policy will be considered. 
In order to clarify these attitudes managers were asked a few questions about their 
opinion concerning international policy, economic policy, policy in the military sphere, 
and particularly policy on conversion. There appears to be no unanimous opinion by the 
managers, on the contrary, there is quite a difference. They are split into two groups: the 
first supporting the policy, and the second against it. The share of the opponents is, on 
the whole, greater than that of the supporters (see Table 1). 
It is an interesting contradiction between the negative attitudes to policy in the mili- 
tary sphere as a whole on the one hand, and a relatively positive opinion about conversion 
on the other hand. Many of the respondents polled are against the policy of weakening 
the armed forces, of declining the mobilizing ideology, of reducing the troops and cutting 
the expenses to personnel provision. But many support the restructuring of the economy 
in favor of the civilian sector. Being 'indoctrinated realists" they would like to have po- 
tential economic benefits from conversion and preserve the high political status of armed 
forces simultaneously. The reason for this relatively developed orientation towards con- 
version is determined mostly due to the possibility of foreign contacts, the opportunity of 
fulfilling civilian commercial orders which are profitable to Russian military R&D insti- 
tutes. Conversion offers prospects at a time when more than 60% of the State's military 
orders have been curtailed. 
The relative support of foreign policy by the managers polled was unexpected. They 
voted for this policy in spite of the fact that it included the withdrawal of Russian troops 
from the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, drawing closer with the West, and 
unanimously opposing aggressive regimes of the Iraq type and other peaceful measures. 
The analysis of the managers' attitudes towards government reforms presented the un- 
expected conclusion that the share of those against the demilitarization course of Russian 
society is not so great. In the meantime, the support of demilitarization is contradictory. 
Table 1 : The Attitude of Military Institutes' Managers Towards Russian Government 
Policy (%) 
Consider 
Kinds of Policy 
- - 
Right Wrong Tot a1 
- 
Foreign policy 
Economic policy 18 8 2 100 
Policy in the military sphere (as a whole) 15 85 100 
Conversion of military production 4 1 5 9 100 
The above-mentioned contradiction, in the estimations of the managers interviewed, 
will manifest itself even more clearly if their attitude to the main political conflict in 
Russia of the recent past-the conflict between the President and the Government on the 
one hand, and the Congress of People's deputies and the Supreme Soviet on the other-is 
analyzed. The answers to the questions: "What is your position in the conflict? Whom do 
you support?" showed that the alternative to Yeltsin's course, submitted by the deputies, 
still has less support: 
Supporting the President and the Government 35 
Supporting Congress and the Supreme Soviet 12 
Supporting neither 47 
Other revlies 6 
Tot a1 100 
Although the share of the opponents of the Russian government's course was greater 
than that of its supporters, the alternative received even less support than the Government 
policy. It was the attituded of the managers to disintegrate themselves altogether from all 
state bodies and their activities but, at the same time, their support of some other "third" 
forces (for example, fascists or extreme Russian nationalists) was out of the question. 
The same attitude applied during the events of 3-4 October 1993 when the army at least 
supported the President and the Government. 
The opinions expressed by the interviewed military institutes' managers are analogous 
to those of other Russian social groups and reflect the social outlook of the country at large. 
Public opinion is far from being unanimous when appraising the reformers' endeavors. It 
reflects the attempts to disintegrate from all sorts of power and suggested alternatives 
and is characterized by the non-acceptance of extreme groupings. 
The considerations mentioned make it possible to conclude that under the conditions 
of unstable political equilibrium existing in Russia today one can hardly expect broad 
organized opposition to the course of reforms on the part of the group in question. It is 
not clear how long such a period will continue because the redundance of MIC is vitally 
requested and nobody exactly knows its future reaction on the policy of cutting expenses. 
But clearly that "the political choice lies between mass unemployment, hyperinflation or 
a combination of the two: mass MIC liquidation will surely create serious unrest, so a 
long period of managed declined seems inevitable, assisted by operating subsidies that 
the West is unlikely to support, to be sustained from a state budget already is serious 
deficit" (Filatotchev, et al., 1993). 
There is every reason to expect that the complicated problems fa.cing the military 
institutes will not be solved by the managers by means of pressure upon the organs of 
power, demand for money and return to the old centralized distribution system. They 
will do their best to achieve their goals through their own efforts. However, the problems 
the institutes are faced with are really complex. 
3 Looking at the Situation in Military Institutes 
Before moving on to the changes in the military institutes under reform conditions and 
the managers' attitudes towards these reforms, a description will be made (without going 
into details) of what these institutes were like during the period preceding the reforms 
when the USSR still existed. 
Military institutes were big organizations usually with 2,000 to 10,000 people. They 
were highly specialized organizations producing military technologies, including both 
R&D and engineering, as well as testing experimental units. They possessed an elab- 
orate management structure often embracing a few dozen, and sometimes, hundreds of 
structural units scattered about the USSR's territory. 
These organizations belonged entirely to the State. Their management was strictly 
centralized, the subject matter of their R&D was approved in a centralized manner and 
their financing was also centralized. The results of their work were not sold but passed 
on to consumers after approval of the authorities. The MIC institutes were created as an 
integral part of a uniform whole, being (functionally) mutually complementary, possess- 
ing a great deal of solidity considering the necessary stability of their work during war 
periods. It is clear, that economic considerations only played a subordinate role. The 
main objectives were military-strategic goals. 
At present the external conditions of the work of the MIC have radically changed. 
Russia is experiencing a period of political and economic reforms. These presuppose the 
expansion of freedom in all spheres of life and military strategic priorities have stopped 
being first and foremost and have to give way to other goals. Contradiction has arisen 
between the old structure of the MIC (including R&D institutes) on the one hand, and 
new conditions and goals (particularly demilitarization) facing the country, on the other. 
In order to understand how to solve the contradiction and make sure it will not lead 
to halting the reforms, it is necessary to analyze the situation arising in MIC institutions, 
the attitude of different groups of people working there towards the reforms and their 
behavior under changing conditions. 
The Soviet system exercised strict state control over the situation in all military in- 
stitutes. This situation was exceedingly stable due to four factors: (1) the military ad- 
ministrative regulations of the organizations' work, strict labor discipline and absolute 
secrecy; (2) a very high degree of centralization in MIC activities, very slight economic 
independence leading to the dominance of non-commodity relations and a very small role 
of financial regulators in the institutes' activities; (3) socio-economic benefits and privi- 
leges given to the institutes because of the priority position the MIC had in the USSR; 
and (4) great social stability of the Soviet society as a whole. 
What is the situation in MIC institutes under reform conditions at present? During 
the previous one or two years, the majority of factors providing the former MIC stability 
no longer existed; the institutes had lost their former benefits in financing their R&D, in 
payment for work done, in material technical supply and social benefits (namely consumer 
goods, boarding houses, hospitals, etc.). The disintegration of the CMEA and of the 
USSR has also had a negative effect on their position which, according to data obtained, 
is very grave. In answer to the question: "What is the situation in your institute?" only 
1% of the managers considered it normal; 72% pointed out that the situation was grave 
but the main scientific potential has been preserved; 25% were of the opinion that the 
main scientific potential was lost and the institute had actually broken up (2% gave other 
answers). 
According to the obtained data the position of the institutes, on the whole, changed 
for the worse during the last year: 
(%) 
The situation improved 4 
The situation worsened 86 
The situation remained unchanged 10 
Tot a1 100 
The estimates, however, are not so grave as to consider the situation disastrous, be- 
cause the majority of the managers polled are of the opinion that in spite of the difficult 
position their institutes are in they have preserved their main potential and are quite 
efficient. This is also confirmed by data obtained during the interviews. According to the 
respondents, all the institutes possess R&D of great scientific value which are sure to be 
competitive on the world market of ideas and technologies. In the institutes there have 
already been instances of their R&D being a commercial success and yielding consider- 
able profit. The matter was touched upon by about 23% of the managers interviewed in 
research units. In their view the share of such successful groups within each unit does 
not vary to a great extent from institute to institute (ranging from 12-25%). It is inter- 
esting to remark, that units involved in such R&D had to produce many commercially 
successful innovations-10 on average. The conclusion arrived at  is that, although mili- 
tary institutes as a whole cannot survive without the State's support, the majority have 
competitive units which can exist under economic freedom conditions and create useful 
R&D. 
However, in the present situation, the institutes have to curtail their R&D which they 
consider forward-looking, capable of bringing tangible scientific results or are commer- 
cially profitable. The conclusion is based on the answers to the question: "Was your 
institute (unit) forced to curtail perspective R&D in 1992 which, in your opinion, should 
be proceeded with?": 
(%) 
No, we are proceeding with our R&D 19 
Part of perspective R&D had to be curtailed 64 
Almost all of perspective R&D had to be curtailed 17 
Tot a1 100 
32% of the respondents were of the opinion that the institutes were curtailing exclu- 
sively military R&D; 54% noted that the curtailment concerned partly military and partly 
civil R&D; according to 14% of the respondents the curtailed R&D were exclusively civil. 
A respondent cited an instance to the point: "There is such an isotope, iodine-131, 
which is used in our medicine. No country in the world would use it (with the exception of 
our country) since its radioactive dose is 100 times greater than that of iodine-123, which 
they use abroad. Formerly the 4th Administration of the Ministry of Health attending 
Party leaders bought iodine-123 in France at the price of 2,000 dollars per 1 Kuri (since 
it is not produced in our country). Not long ago we devised a method which reduced 
the cost of iodine production to 200 rubles per 1 Kuri of iodine. At first, the Ministry 
financed us but then stopped doing it. We got a certain amount of iodine but we needed 
big installations for its industrial production. So we made arrangements with a firm which 
spent 150,000 rubles. We made an installation but did not manage to finish it as the firm 
was no longer able to finance us and so in December, 1991 everything was curtailed and 
stopped." 
The curtailment of military institutes' activities is due to a large number of factors. 
These have been brought to light by obtaining answers to the following question: "What 
are the main difficulties in the work of your institute?" Among the difficulties, the man- 
agers mentioned the following:] 
Insufficient financing 
Disorganization of the financial system 
Inadequate state orders 
Lack of information about the State's intentions 
towards military institutes 
The outflow of personnel 
The shortage of resources 
Poor work of ministries and departments 
The uncontrollability of personnel 
Lack of foreign orders 4 
The above-mentioned difficulties can be divided into two groups. The first group 
embraces difficulties of the external socio-economic environment, where the institutes 
exist (these are external difficulties). The second group includes difficulties inherent in 
the institutes themselves. According to the leaders, the main factors hampering the 
institutes' functioning lie outside them and are connected with the State. 
Both groups of difficulties will now be considered in detail. Financial difficulties are 
the greatest among those the institutes encounter. According to the managers' estimates, 
the institutes are provided with 48% of the necessary funding, considering the number 
of employees, their possibilities and research facilities of the organizations. To put it 
'Since the respondents were allowed to choose more than one variant the total does not equal 100%. 
8 
another way, a good half of the personnel, the industrial premises and equipment can not 
work at  full capacity. Naturally, all this makes the managers search intensively for orders 
and their search brings certain results. At present, half of the money received by the 
investigated military institutes is granted by the State budget, 38% is obtained through 
the state enterprises' own funds, 11% is provided for by new business firms, and foreign 
customers account for 1%. 
The present situation reveals a very weak internal demand for R&D: the Government 
has been forced to reduce it, while the arising private sector is not strong enough and 
competition within it is not high enough to give rise to a substantial private demand for 
innovations. The decline in demand is aggravated by the general disorganization of the 
state machine, and the struggle of different political groupings for power which results 
in the constant changes of instructions and directions. Besides, the transition from the 
centralized to the market system has disorganized the financial system and has appeared 
to be very painful to all Russian organizations, military institutes included. 
The personnel in the USSR military organizations was characterized by exceptional 
stability. To get a job in 'a military" was extremely difficult. People anticipated their jobs 
for life and, as a rule, never left the work place of their own accord. Now, the situation 
has cardinally changed because of external transformations. These resulted in the loss of 
personnel stability and many research groups are disintegrating. This is confirmed by the 
interviewed managers' estimates concerning the stability of their personnel: 
(%I 
The research group is stable on the whole 3 8 
There is a stable nucleus, the other parts are often changing 30 
The group is disintegrating 32 
Tot a1 100 
The disintegration of research groups is accompanied by the reduction in the number 
of those employed in military institutes. This reduction (against the background of the 
increase in the number of those employed in the military institutes in 1985) reached 
approximately 40% in 1992, according to the estimates of the managers polled. For the 
last two or three years the institutes' personnel was reduced 2-2.5 times. It was a healthy 
process in many respects since, in the majority of the units (in the opinion of the polled 
managers), the number of those employed was set too high envisaging the possible needs 
of a war period. 
According to the obtained data, the first to leave are leading researchers, experienced, 
well-educated specialists. The share of specialists of this type has dropped to 15-20% 
compared with previous years. The number of researchers with scientific degrees is de- 
creasing. For example, in one of the investigated institutes the number of candidates of 
science has dropped 45% to pre-reform level and that of doctors of science to 113. 
According to the expert estimation of a design bureau researcher in the aircraft in- 
dustry, the section of researchers constituting the scientific potential of the unit amounts 
to 10-15% of the total number of researchers and engineers. It is this section (according 
to the majority of those polled) that decreased in the military institutes with the utmost 
speed. The same tendencies emerged in other branches of science, for example, in basic 
research (see, for instance, Klistorin, 1993). 
94% of the managers are of the opinion that people are leaving their jobs because of 
low wages. At the time of the survey (at the beginning of 1993) the researchers' wages 
totalled 10,500 rubles, which is almost 25% less than the Russian Federation's average. 
What jobs do military institutes' researchers take? According to the managers' esti- 
mates they leave for the following  organization^:^ 
Business firms not involved in science 8 1 
Firms dealing with R&D 37 
Plants, industrial enterprises 28 
Other units of the same institute 17 
Other research institutes 9 
Government (local and federal) administ rat ion 8 
Other organizations 4 
Alhough, according to our data, none of the investigated institutes' researchers took 
a job abroad, some of them are willing to do so (in the opinion of the managers). The 
share of those willing to do this constitutes a little more than 115 of all of the researchers, 
and it reaches about 40% of the younger ones. 
The brain drain in the basic research sector has actually begun: according to some 
estimations about 5-10% of researchers really emigrated during the last few years from, for 
example, Novosibirsk Academytown (Klistorin, ibid., p. 35). Western specialists evaluate 
that at the moment emigration "is one of the main ways in which the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe can rejoin the international scientific community, and it enables their 
researchers to receive further training internationallyn (Tinguy and Weden, 1993). Thus, 
the personnel situation in the investigated institutes has deteriorated and there are no 
grounds to suppose its further improvement. 
The working regulations and strict secrecy in military institutes, always extreme in 
the USSR, were controlled by the secret service placed under the command of the KGB. 
However, during the process of reforms certain changes also took place in this sphere. 
These were opposite in character: 
1. The effect of the changes was to ease working regulations and control over the 
behavior of those employed; 
2. The working regulations were even more toughened in some institutes. 
'Since the respondents were allowed to choose more than one variant the total does not equal 100%. 
10 
These changes resulted from the different kinds of policy pursued by the institutes' 
managers. In the institutes where managers were striving to preserve the personnel nu- 
cleus, working regulations were considerably eased. The following measures were intro- 
duced. People were allowed to do some extra work in new business firms in addition to 
their main work, they were no longer forced to work according to a strict schedule, their 
working week was short, and so on. It became customary to  allow quite a large number of 
researchers go on leave if there were no orders and do work elsewhere. Thus, for example, 
in the investigated institutes 1/10 of those employed worked part-time. 
During an interview, a researcher from a Moscow design bureau, illustrated the changes 
following the easing of working regulations as follows: "Many scientists are participating 
in the work of joint ventures and other new business firms, attached to the institutes. 
This has become possible only of late. But their business activities are not limited to the 
inside ones; they may also take up jobs and earn money somewhere else. This is due to 
a greater ease of passage regulations in the design bureau. Now during the working day 
they may leave the institute grounds of their own accord. Working in business, scientists 
can now increase their earnings 2 or 3 times, remaining on the staff of the bureau. Thus 
a free hand given to the scientists by the managers makes for the improvement of their 
living standards and keeps them within the framework of the institute". 
The easing of working regulations reflected the institutes' managers reaction towards 
outside changes. One of the respondents admitted: "If we had not eased the working 
regulations there would have been no researcher in the institute at all". 
However, in some institutes they still aimed at toughening working conditions. This 
took place in the institutes where the managers wanted to reduce the number of those 
employed (for example, when striving to decrease the number of potential participants of 
the institutes' property privatization process). Such toughening of working regulations 
manifested itself in the struggle to raise labor discipline, in the ban to combine jobs, in 
the preservation of strict secrecy to the full, and so on. 
On the whole, the easing of working regulations and secrecy prevailed, and so the 
necessary prerequisites were created for the institutes and their R&D to become more 
"openn under economic freedom conditions. But the new conditions (in the opinion of 
the polled managers) would not let them "disclose themselves to the utmost", because 
business considerations also require secrecy. But the way of keeping secrets of this kind is 
quite different from the manner military secrets are kept from foreign intelligence service 
agents. 
This has had an effect on both easing passage regulations and, to some extent, eas- 
ing secrecy in military institutes. Participation in outside business activities also meant 
greater openness in the work of military institutes. 
As of the middle of 1992 it has been noted that military institutes are involved in 
commercial affairs even more than civil institutes. This involvement has increased since 
then. 
The involvement of military institutes into commercial affairs aciivities is being real- 
ized with the support of business firms founded by their own device: small enterprises, 
limited liability companies, joint stock companies, commercial centers, etc. The founda- 
tion activity of the reviewed institutes has taken on rather a large scale: according to 
estimations an average of about seven firms have been set up with Russian capital and 
two joint ventures for each of these institutes within their frames. 
There are two ways of founding business firms in the military R&D sector. The first is 
bottom-up. An ambitious scientist with business qualities leaves the institute and creates 
his own firm (outside of his former organization, as a rule, because he is usually hindered 
there by the management). Then he supplies the orders to the people he knows well and 
whose quality of work he is assured. The second is top-down. The firm is founded by 
the managers of the institute, and some portion of the employees (usually close to the 
managers) are included in the staff of the firm. The managers, using their position and 
connections, look for orders and legalize them via the firm. 
Not all of the employees in the institute partake in the business activity of business 
firms-about 13% usually, and their payment is higher compared to others. The gap in 
payments between workers at the same level in various units is four times higher according 
to data received. This provokes conflicts and stimulates people to leave the units which 
do not possess market orders. 
The activities of newly created business firms are mainly of a non-scientific character, 
and account for about 71% of the total production. The activity is diverse: it may be 
the maintenance of high technologies and transport services and commercial intermedi- 
ary operations. The R&D and their implementation account for only 27% of the total 
production of business firms. However, their total scope of activity is not so small, being 
about 11% of the total production of the parent organization. 
Naturally, the control over the activity of the firms under military institutes is consid- 
erably weaker than that over the work of the institutes themselves which, in principle, is 
creating conditions for the uncontrollable leakage of military technologies. It is necessary 
to study in detail the available experience of work at business firms under the institutes 
with a military profile, and then, on the basis of the studies to elaborate a special legis- 
lature regime of cooperation of such institutes with the firms. This regime must indicate 
the rights and responsibilities of officials and personnel, methods of settling mutual pre- 
tensions between them, etc. With this legal basis in existence, the process of creating and 
operating business firms under state military R&D organizations could continue in rela- 
tively secure forms and could confine possible leakages of military technologies abroad. In 
addition, this danger could be minimized with the successful conversion of military R&D. 
There is no unanimous understanding, at present, as to how the conversion in mil- 
itary institutes should take place, which stages it should pass through, which financial 
resources it will require, and specifically in what it will result. Moreover, there is not 
even an approximate understanding of the conversion conception in a military institute. 
Therefore, we started studying conversion problems with the following question to the 
managers: uThere is much talk about conversion at present. What is your understanding 
of conversion?' This revealed a certain diversity of opinions: 
(%) 
Total renunciation of military industry production; 
cease of military R&D 1 
Total stoppage of the production of offensive armaments 
and corresponding R&D 4 
Fulfillment of former military orders on a smaller scale 4 9 
Retaining military orders at the previous level with 
increasing civil activities 34 
Others 12 
Total 100 
The most popular idea of conversion is in diminishing the size of military orders and 
retaining previous topics of work. Such understanding of conversion is, of course, very 
comfortable for military institutes, but is hardly acceptable for society. 
This understanding of conversion is giving rise to the idea of proper conversion which 
should take place in the institutes of the respondents. The opinion of the respondents is 
that the conversion in their institutes should be as follows: 
(%) 
Fulfillment of only military R&D (no conversion is needed) 3 
Fulfillment of individual civil R&D 24 
Fulfillment of civil and military R&D on an equal basis 6 3 
Fulfillment of predominantly civil R&D 9 
We are already fulfilling only civil R&D 1 
Total 100 
The surveyed managers think conversion in their organizations should lead to the 
fulfillment of military and civil R&D in their institutes on an equal basis. However, already 
at present, only 55% of financial resources are spent on military R&D. Accordingly, 45% 
are spent on civil R&D. So, the conversion in the above mentioned sense has already taken 
place. 
Civil R&D has indeed occupied an important place in the activity of the surveyed 
military institutes. Almost 314 of the units were implementing them in 1992, and not in 
small quantities (on average, a division fulfilled 14 civil orders). Only 26% of the units 
did not fulfill such orders. 
There is considerable potential for conducting conversion in the surveyed institutes, by 
the assessments of the respondents: 94% have pointed out that their divisions could fulfill 
more civil R&D than they do nowadays. The research groups of the military institutes 
could, by the managers' assessments, increase the volume of civil R&D by 55% given 
sufficient demand. Moreover, about 213 of the respondents indicated that in perspective 
their units could transit to implementing entirely civil R&D. In their opinion, it would 
require a rather long period of five years, on average. 
The successful transition to civil R&D is certainly possible only with the positive 
attitudes of scientists, engineers, and administration towards conversion. Therefore the 
attitude of the military institutes' personnel towards conversion in their organization was 
assessed. The following assessments have been received. 
Attitude towards conversion as distributed in the research group: (%) 
Positive 45 
Negative 34 
Indifferent 21 
Tot a1 100 
Although a significant part of the people among the surveyed military institutes regard 
conversion negatively, the positive attitude still dominates. Thus, it is possible to draw 
the conclusion that there is a certain psychological readiness of the people for conversion 
in military institutes. 
To realize this readiness it is necessary to create economic, legal, and organizational 
conditions which could stimulate the conversion. It seems that the leading role in creating 
such conditions should be played by the State. In order to find out what is specifically 
needed on the part of the State to really stimulate the conversion so that most military 
institutes could start fulfilling civil R&D, managers were asked the following question: 
'What must be done by the state to provide the transition of your institute to the ful- 
fillment of civil orders?" In the opinion of the respondents, the following measures are 
(%) 
To give a state order for civil R&D 60 
To allocate money from the budget specifically for the 
transition to civil orders 53 
To free civil R&D of military institutes from taxes 3 0 
To allow the privatization of the property of the institutes 9 
To make an inventory of the R&D, to leave only a small part 
of the really secret ones as closed topics 8 
Other measures 4 
The managers are mainly claiming for financial demands from the State and are almost 
not mentioning the necessity of adapting legislature measures. This is explained by the 
fact that frequent changes of "the rules of the game" by the State have shaken people's 
faith in its legislature activity. 
The respondents realize that for real conversion not only the efforts from the State 
are needed, but also changes inside the institutes themselves: changes in management 
3Since the respondents were allowed to choose more than one variant the total does not equal 100% 
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structure, working regulations, and retraining of some personnel. 31% of the managers 
state that in their units the process of retraining is already going on in connection with 
the fulfillment of civil orders, 20% of the respondents intend to conduct retraining, and 
49% do not intend. In the assessments of the managers conducting retraining about 
115 of their workers are being retrained. At the same time, the scope of retraining is 
insufficient, in the opinion of respondents, and it is necessary to additionally retrain 
another 114 approximately of the total staff available for the successful transition to civil 
R&D. Having realized that it is not possible to provide for conversion without retraining 
in the long run, more than half, 56%, of the respondents intend to conduct it in future 
(the other 44% have no such intention). 
It seems that, in principle, there are favorable social-psychological conditions to con- 
duct conversion in military institutes. They have accumulated some serious experience of 
fulfilling civil R&D. In this situation one of the key conditions for successfully implemen- 
tating conversion is the availability of effective demand (whether State or private demand) 
for civil R&D. If such demand is not formed in Russia in the nearest future, it will be 
difficult to expect evidently a "voluntary conversion" on the part of military institutes. 
The situation, therefore, in the investigated military institutes, according to the esti- 
mates of those polled, was getting worse, on the whole. However, this worsening possessed 
certain elements for revival. The managers expressed much concern about the lack of or- 
ders for their R&D resulting in a shortage of financial resources. They were forced to 
search for orders and work for real customers because the State budget stopped financing 
them as it did previously, practically meeting all their needs. 
In the meantime, great differences in working conditions among military institutes 
emerged recently. In the old centralized system, the State controlled these conditions 
and supervised to smoothen wages, working regulations, etc., in various organizations. 
With economic freedom in some military institutes, the socio-economic situation became 
significantly worse, in others it did not change, but the position of a few organizations 
improved. In order to know what are the potential changes in the working conditions of 
military institutes, it is necessary to analyze the differences in stable and disintegrating 
organizations. 
The Situation in Stable and Disintegrating 
Institutes: A Comparative Analysis 
The comparison of the situation in different institutes were classified according to man- 
agers' answers to the question: "What is the situation in your institute?". Using the 
answers presented above (1% replied that the situation is normal, 72% that the situation 
is hard, but main science capabilities remained, 25% that the capabilities are lost, 2% 
other replies) the situation was analyzed as a whole. The answers in different institutes 
is now compared. 
Table 2: The Variations of Managers' Estimations of the Situation in the Surveyed Insti- 
tutes (%) 
The Situation in the Institute 
Institutes Hard but Potential The Organization has Tot a1 
is Retained Practically Disintegrated 
1 64 3 6 100 
2 43 5 7 100 
3 73 27 100 
4 9 1 9 100 
5 76 24 100 
Average 74 26 100 
In each of the surveyed institutes there were managers estimating the situation in 
a different way. However, although unanimity was not achieved, the assessments were 
strikingly different between the institutes (Table 2).4 
The author has made the classification of the institutes on the basis of these evalua- 
tions. The institutes numbered 1 and 2 were classified as the first group of organizations 
where the situation is unstable; and the institutes numbered 3, 4, and 5 as the second 
group with a relatively stable situation. The organization was considered unstable if 113 
of its managers of the units thought it had actually disintegrated, and the others thought 
its situation was hard. This figure (113) was used as a counting threshold. The con- 
versations held in the institutes have also shown that the situation in the organizations 
selected by this principle is close to critical. 
Among the surveyed people there were 30% working in two unstable institutes, and 
70% in three relatively stable ones. But what is the actual difference between military 
institutes of two types? Firstly, the unstable organizations are characterized by a high 
degree of instability in the personnel situation (Table 3).' The differences in assessments of 
stability of the research groups between the types of institutes are statistically significant: 
the share of stable groups in stable institutes is more than twice that of the unstable ones. 
The latter are characterized by the groups with a stable personnel nucleus (and mobile 
other parts of personnel) as well as by the disintegrating one. Thus, by the managers' 
assessments obtained, there are about 40% of non-viable, disintegrating groups in unstable 
institutes, while in relatively stable organizations their number is only slightly over one 
fourth. 
Secondly, unstable military institutes are mainly those which have mostly retained 
their previous R&D. And on the contrary, the organizations which have refrained from 
4The data do not account for "the other replies". The answers "the situation is normal" were adjoined 
to the replies "the situation is hard, but the main scientific potential remained" because there were not 
many and it did not distort the general picture of estimation differences. 
SThe staff of the research units in the institutes: laboratories, sectors, departments, etc., is meant. 
Table 3: The Differences in Research Groups Stability Assessments by Managers in Un- 
stable and Stable Institutes (%) 
Types of Research Groups 
Institutes Stable Stable Nucleus Disintegrating Total 
Unstable 2 1 4 0 39 100 
Stable 46 26 28 100 
Average 39 30 31 100 
Table 4: The State of Prospective R&D in Stable and Unstable Military Institutes (as- 
sessments by managers, %) 
Types of Prospective R&D 
Institutes Everything Partially Almost Completely Total 
is Continued Curt ailed Curtailed 
Unstable 46 
Stable 9 
Average 19 
even prospective military R&D, have found themselves in a far better situation (Table 
4)? 
Although ceasing promising R&D took place in both more or less stable and unstable 
organizations, the types of research being curtailed in these two types of institutes were 
different. Military R&D were mostly curtailed in stable organizations, and civil ones in 
unstable institutes (Table 5). 
Of course, R&D in the institutes surveyed were not only curtailed but also initiated: 
about 314 of the units started new research in the organizations of both types in 1992- 
1993. However they initiated different research: military R&D relatively more often in 
unstable institutes, and civil ones in stable organizations (Table 6). One should notice, 
however, that in both types of institutes civil R&D were initiated more often than military 
ones. 
Following on from what is mentioned above in contrast to  the unstable institutes, those 
which managed to  better adapt themselves to the changes in the country possess relatively 
more stable personnel and are more oriented for conversion and changing their R&D 
for the demand of the civil sector. The unstable organization, on the contrary, despite 
high mobility of the personnel, remained more conservative and reacted insufficiently and 
slowly to  the changing demand for R&D. But before discussing the reasons for those 
variations, the differences in social moods and behavior at enterprises of different types 
will be considered. 
'The table is based on managers' replies to the question: "Was your unit forced to curtail prospective 
R&D in 1992-1993 which, in your opinion, had to be continued?" 
Table 5: Types of R&D which were being Curtailed in Relatively Stable and Unstable 
Institutes (%) 
Types of Mainly the Following R&D were Curtailed 
Institutes Military and Total 
Civil Civil Equally Military 
Unstable 2 7 
St able 11 
Average 13 
Table 6: Types of R&D which were Initiated in Various Military Institutes in 1992-1993 
(%I 
Types of Mainly the Following R&D were Initiated 
Institutes Military and Tot a1 
Military Civil Civil Equally 
Unstable 32 44 24 100 
Stable 24 53 23 100 
Average 26 51 23 100 
As a result of the differences in the situation the social moods and economic behavior 
of people is notably diverse in the institutes. These differences in moods are revealed in 
the assessments by managers of the future in their organizations (Table 7).7 
Those managers thinking their organization will no longer exist or nothing will be 
changed constitute a relative majority in unstable organizations. The managers of the 
stable institutes expect more changes. Some of them think their organization will be- 
come a non-state institute or stop R&D completely. And these opinions have sufficient 
grounding. 
The managers in the stable institutes on the whole are more optimistic and confident 
about the future. The same mood is evidently typical for the personnel in these institutes. 
Consequently the possible leakage of military technologies abroad is less likely in these 
institutes (Table 8).8 
These data confirm a rather common but rarely adequately grounded conception of 
the MIC danger proportional to social tension. The detente of social tension is urgent not 
only for its own sake, but also for the security of society. 
 h he estimations were obtained from the answers to the question: "How do you imagine your institute 
in 1-2 years? How will its economic status and profile change?". Since the respondents were allowed to 
choose more than one variant the total does not equal 100%. 
8The assessments were received from the replies to the question: "What do you think, if the present 
tendencies remain, will you be compelled to sell military R&D abroad in the nearest future?" 
Table 7: The Estimations by Managers of the Future in their Institutes (%) 
The Potential Events will Emerge: 
Types of R&D Level Nothing The Institute There will The Institute 
Institutes will will will No Longer be No will be 
Increase Change be State Owned R&D Closed 
Unstable 9 59 0 2 1 16 
St able 10 42 16 39 11 
Average 10 47 11 34 12 
Table 8: Diversified Assessments of Possibilities to Sell Military Technologies Abroad in 
the Nearest Future (%) 
Institutes Will be Compelled No Total 
Unstable 7 1 29 100 
Stable 38 6 2 100 
Average 46 54 100 
Social tension and potential danger from Russian MIC forced the analysis of the factors 
of variation among stable and disintegrating institutes in order to know why some of them 
have a relatively good position and others are in trouble. 
The variation in question is provoked by two groups of factors: objective and sub- 
jective. The former are the branch of science and possibilities to conversion, quality of 
available equipment and instruments, structure of financing, loss of contacts with the 
institutes and plants from the former USSR republics, etc. These will be discussed in 
detail. 
The analysis shows that objective factors explain, to a great extent, the differences 
in the position of the institutes of various types. First of all, the research facilities are 
notably better in stable organizations (Table 9). Almost 213 of the respondents from 
these organizations think that the research facilities are quite satisfactory although lower 
compared to world standards (only 113 think it is out of date). This is quite different in 
the unstable institutes where more than half of the respondents claim the equipment of 
their organizations to be out of date. 
The state of instruments and equipment is, of course, an important factor determining 
the position of an organization under market conditions, however the availability of orders 
and financing is even more important. And here, paradoxical as it may be, the situation 
seems completely opposite. By managers' assessments in the stable institutes, their units 
are only financially provided for 44%, while in unstable ones this figure is almost 1.5 times 
higher and constitutes 6l%.' 
'This was found in the answers of the managers to the question: "How much is your unit financially 
provided approximately, taking into account the size of personnel and research capabilities, as well as 
equipment and instruments available?" 
Table 9: Differences in Equipment and Instruments in the Institutes of Various Types 
(%I 
Types of Equipment and Instruments 
Institutes At the Lower than World Out of Tot a1 
World Level Level but Satisfactory Date 
Unstable 0 46 54 100 
Stable 7 60 33 100 
Average 5 56 39 100 
Table 10: The Structure of Financing R&D in Military Institutes by Managers' Assess- 
ments (%) 
Types of Financing Share on Account of: 
Institutes State State Russian Foreign Tot a1 
Budget Enterprises Business Firms Customers 
Unstable 56 31 22 1 100 
Stable 52 39 7 2 100 
Average 53 38 8 1 100 
This paradox may partially be explained if one considers the financing structure (Table 
10). 
The unstable military institutes have relatively more funding from the budget, while 
the stable organizations-on account of the orders from the state enterprises. The former 
ones receive more money from Russian business. Therefore, the stable institutes are 
actually the organizations which have retained their traditional links with state enterprises 
and work to their orders, despite the fact that the stable institutes are suffering from a 
reduction of budget funding relatively much more than the unstable ones. This is seen 
from the replies to the question: "Why was it necessary to stop R&D?" . The reason for the 
unstable enterprises-"reduction of budget financing" occupies second place (indicated by 
only 47% of the respondents) and for the stable ones, first place (77%). The reduction of 
budget funding was presumably helpful for those working with better quality and close 
contacts with state enterprises which they managed to retain. 
The third factor which aggravated the situation in a number of institutes is the loss of 
partners and customers in the former USSR republics. This loss, as a result of curtailing 
the work in unstable organizations, was indicated in the replies to the question almost 
three times more frequently (31% versus 11%) in the stable institutes. The situation was 
naturally more complicated for those possessing units, customers and consumers in the 
former republics of the Soviet Union than for those who did not possess any. They were 
simply unable to fulfill many contracts because of the lack of qualified personnel and 
Table 11: The Assessments of the Adequacy of Fulfilled Civil Orders to Research Capa- 
bilities of the Institutes (%) 
The Adequacy of Orders: 
Types of Not Corresponding 
Institutes Adequate Too Simple to the Profile of Tot a1 
the Institute 
Unstable 66 
Stable 80 
Average 70 
necessary equipment. Evidently, neither relatively high funding from the budget, nor the 
orders from business, can still make up these losses. 
And, finally, the fourth objective factor which caused differences in the position of the 
institutes-the kind of their specialization: whether it be narrow or wide. Those special- 
ized in a strictly limited military sphere of R&D and possessing adequate instruments 
and equipment, personnel and experience of work, appeared to be in a worse situation 
(Table 11). Important evidence of such inadequacy is also the necessity of retraining per- 
sonnel for making conversion. Thus, in their answers to the question: "What percentage 
approximately of your staff need to be retrained for the conversion?" the managers in 
stable institutes pointed out 24% versus one third of them in the unstable organizations. 
It is more difficult for the latter to find civil orders and to be able to fulfill them using the 
available experience of R&D, instruments and equipment without additional specialists 
from the outside. Therefore, even if there is potentially general demand for new civil 
R&D, the strictly specialized military institutes are unable to fully meet it. 
Thus, there is a number of objective factors which have predetermined a hard situation 
in some military institutes. However, the total complex of these factors is contradictory. 
For example, the situation with financing of R&D in the institutes assessed by their 
managers as unstable, has turned out notably better than in the organizations, where, 
by managers' estimations, the situation was relatively stable. It is impossible to explain 
exhaustively the revealed paradox within the frames of the considered objective factors. 
This testifies the necessity of a more profound analysis of the system of factors presently 
influencing the position of the military institutes. 
Among the subjective factors determining the position of organizations are: the man- 
agers' capability for conducting and actually conducting various types of policy in favor of 
their institutes, labor mobility, involvement of personnel into business activities, person- 
nel's identification with the organization, wages of personnel. The main factor, in actual 
conditions, (in the author's opinion) is the policy that the managers implemented will be 
considered. 
According to the analysis, the policy conducted by the administration in relation to 
their organizations varies greatly in the institutes of different types. 
Table 12: The Estimations of Variations in Labor Mobility in Institutes of Various Types 
(in % to total number of personnel at the beginning of 1992) 
Types of Leaving of Their Reduction of 
Institutes Dismissed Own Accord Entering in Number 
Unstable 13 18 4 2 7 
Stable 23 15 1 3 7 
Average 18 16 2 32 
Table 13: Evaluations of Official Wages of Different Groups, Rubles 
Types of Wages 
Institutes Technical 
Administration Scientists Personnel 
Unstable 20,086 10,854 8,486 
Stable 17,259 10,322 7,003 
Average 17,960 10,458 7,368 
The staff policy differs above all. It is rigid in stable institutes and consists of pur- 
poseful redundancy of workers with restricted employment (Table 12). 
It is interesting to point out that stable institutes appear less stable than unstable if 
judged by purely quantitative data, which seems contradictory to the conclusions above. 
However, a relatively more significant reduction of the number of personnel in stable 
institutes is the result of purposeful personnel policy: the people relatively less frequently 
left their institutes on their own accord, but they were dismissed relatively more often. 
So redundancy, as such, is not an unfavorable situation indicator in itself; it is im- 
portant to know what processes determine this redundancy. In more stable institutes 
it evidently testifies to the improvement of the situation, to the normal adaptation of 
the institutes to new environmental conditions. They retain stability due to the policy 
of purposeful redundancies and a rather considerable decrease of the total number of 
personnel. 
Besides the staff policy, the wages policy also differs greatly. As far as the official wage 
level is concerned, the situation seems also unexpectedly paradoxical at first glance: its 
level on the whole and by groups is somewhat higher in unstable institutes (Table 13). 
An endeavor to explain this will be made later. 
It should be pointed out that the differences in the policy are more striking regarding 
payments in various units: in unstable institutes the discrepancy is three times and in the 
stable ones five times. 
The important variations are taking place in the strategy of development of the busi- 
ness firms under the institutes. Their quantity, scope and nature of activity show the 
degree of involvement of the surveyed organizations in the business activity. The number 
of such firms is considerably higher in stable institutes: nine versus three in the unstable 
ones. They are also different in the nature of their activities in institutes of various types. 
In stable organizations this activity is relatively more oriented at production-commercial 
targets-72% against 59% of the total output of the business activity, while in the un- 
stable organizations it is aimed at  the development and extension of R&D-33% against 
26%. (8% in unstable organizations and 2% in stable ones are otherwise directed). Even 
the commercial success of R&D, more often achieved in unstable institutes, could not 
change the situation in them, not allowing to compensate the negative effect of other 
unfavorable factors. 30% of unit managers in the unstable institutes indicated that they 
had commercially successful R&D, reaching 18 R&D per unit on average, against 20% or 
only three commercially successful R&D per unit in the stable institutes. 
A high degree of involvement of the institutes into the business activity where, by 
managers' estimations, the situation was relatively favorable, is ensuring considerable 
revenues not accounted by official wages. Therefore, relatively high wages in unstable 
institutes are presumably incomparable with the additional incomes obtainable from the 
business activity which is more practiced in the institutes of another type. 
Therefore, the diversified policy conducted by the managers in institutes of various 
types was one of the main reasons why some of them have managed to adapt themselves 
to the changes and others could not. And consequently, some institutes appeared in a 
relatively stable situation and others are disintegrating. 
Instead of a Conclusion: Is There Neo-militarism 
in Russia? 
Two contradictory processes are developing in Russia now. The first is demilitarization 
including the reduction of the arms role in public and State policy. The second is the 
emergence of neo-militarism in Russia. 
Demilitarization started against the background of sharp socio-economic and political 
contradictions. Beyond Russia's frontiers there were about 25 million ethnic Russians 
who found themselves under the pressure of dominating nationalities. This has given 
rise to constant tension in Russia's relations with the former republics of the USSR. The 
boundaries of the country are the scenes of endless armed conflicts, having a destabilizing 
effect on the situation in Russia. 
In September 1993, 200 experts were asked to evaluate the closed results (half of the 
year period) of war conflicts on Russian boundaries. They answered:'' 
''We asked the experts: "What do you think about closed (half of the year) results of wars Russia 
participated in at the moment?" 
(%I 
All war conflicts will be solved via political means 9 
Only part of the conflicts will be solved via political means 60 
All wars Russia is involved in will continue 6 
Some new wars will emerge in addition to current conflicts 24 
Do not know 1 
Tot a1 100 
Most experts did not expect the near termination of all the wars with Russia's par- 
ticipation. However, they were not pessimists concerning all conflicts. Temporary silence 
in Pridnestrovie, Abkhazia, Prigorodniy rajon, and some other regions, confirms that it 
is possible to get fragile peace in favor of political efforts. 
Unfortunately some new war provoked factors have emerged recently. Firstly, the 
3-4 October 1993 events, which gave the population and politicians the experience of 
real civil war in Russia. As a result of these events, some nationalist and communist 
groupings changed their behavior and concentrated on the illegal methods of opposition. 
These groupings are small in size but well organized and well trained. The militia and 
the Ministry of Security are in trouble now, the staff are focussing on their own economic 
problems and unlikely have the capabilities to control the activities of these groupings. 
Secondly, the new war provoked factor is the election of Zhirinovskiy to the Federal 
Assembly. This event itself cannot provoke any war, but Zhirinovskiy (in spite of the 
fact that he is not a "pure Russian") is propagating the new ideological spirit of "pro- 
tection of suffered Russiansn in the republics of the former USSR and the creation of 
a new Russia in territories where Russians are dominated quantitatively. Certainly this 
may produce additional tension between Russia and some neighbors (particularly, Kaza- 
khstan, the Baltic states, Moldova, and internal national autonomies such as Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, Chechnia, Buratiya, and Tuva). Except this consequence the aggressive- 
ness among the population may also increase in Russia, favorably provoking the social 
climate for war. 
A number of economic problems can hardly be resolved: inflation, slump in produc- 
tion, the decrease of the purchasing power of the ruble. Thus conversion faces serious 
difficulties. The privatization process is not fast enough, the conditions for private enter- 
prise have not yet been created. Social problems are still sharpening: living standards are 
being reduced, the span of life is being shortened, crime and terrorism are rising. Under 
such conditions at tempts at demilitarization are encountering opposition both on the part 
of the State and society. 
Great pressure was being made by the army and MIC on the Government, forcing it 
not to reduce defense expenditure. Different State bodies were elaborating conceptions 
of toughening Russia's foreign policy as regards its attitude towards its neighbors. The 
conception of the so-called 'economic conversion" has been, to some extent, popular 
of late among Russian MIC managers. This conception is based on the assumption that 
genuine conversion can be executed only at  a time when money for its implementation has 
already been secured by the sales of arms abroad. Consequently arms production should 
be intensified, the product sold, and it is only then that conversion could be started. 
If one refers to military science, a note should be made about the danger of poorly 
controlled sales of Russian military technology abroad, caused by the position of military 
institutes becoming more complicated in conditions of increasing economic and political 
freedom. For a long time possible dangers in this sphere have already given rise to 
apprehension both in the West and in Russia (see, for example, Walker, 1992).11 With 
a few exceptions, though, this apprehension is far from being ill-grounded. This has also 
been proved by the opinion poll of military institutes' managers carried out in 1993, when 
they were asked the question: 'Are you writing a lot that military institutes are forced 
to sell their R&D abroad?"-55% of those polled answered affirmatively; 44% negatively. 
90% of the managers noted that these were isolated instances; 7% stated that about half 
of R&D is sold abroad, and 3% were of the opinion that almost all R&D is sold out. 
Although the majority of R&D sold abroad is probably officially permitted, there is 
a possibility of an undesired leakage of military technology because of the ill-balanced 
mechanism of Russia's foreign ties and the country's almost transparent borders with the 
former Soviet Republics. 
Not only formal organizations slow down demilitarization in Russia. The residents of 
Russia, possessed by the fear of the growth of crime coupled with the inactivity of the 
militia, are trying to provide themselves with any means of defense: they buy knives, 
gas-cylinders, gas pistols, guns, and other weapons. 
In the country some national-patriotic parties and various movements, possessing 
groups of well-trained fighters, were formed and joined unions. Private businesses cre- 
ated rather big and well-equipped security systems to defend their properties. 
Little by little the climate of neo-militarism is emerging in the country. To put it 
differently, the neo-militarization of Russia from the bottom-up, now underway, can be 
looked upon as a sort of reaction to the most complicated political and socioeconomic 
problems which confront the country during the transition period. It is dramatically 
important to obtain the answer to the question which of these processes, demilitarization 
or militarization, will get the upper hand. At the moment it is not too late to stop 
neo-militarization. 
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